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A Word from

For over five weeks, countering one attack after another, the Eighth Army under General Walton ("Bulldog") Walker fought the North Korean army along the Pusan Perimeter as the enemy tried to push the last Americans from the peninsula. Two hundred miles away, an invasion force coursed secretly through the seas, en route to Inchon harbor. In the early hours of September 15, 1950, the invasion force, composed of soldiers and marines, seized the tiny island of Wolmi which dominated Inchon. Later in the day, at the next high tide, soldiers and marines assaulted over the seawall and began to sweep through the harbor. By midday on September 16 they had advanced several miles to the east, en route to the next objective: Seoul.

Even as the North Koreans reeled from this blow, General Walker positioned his forces for a breakout. As enemy forces assaulting Pusan found their supplies and communications slowed to a trickle, Navy, Marine, and Air Force aircraft hit targets across South Korea, disrupting North Korea's command and control and cutting its army into disparate pieces. When the time was ripe, General Walker took the initiative, striking out violently to the north and west. The invasion force, under Lieutenant General Edward Almond, soon linked up with the Eighth Army to drive north. These joint sledgehammers were integrated so well, and their strikes were coordinated with such precision and explosive force, that the North Korean defense was crushed. By October 1, just two weeks after the Inchon landings, American forces reached the 38th Parallel in their push toward the Manchurian border.

Though many of us identify joint warfighting with operations such as Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf, Eldorado Canyon in Libya, and Just Cause in Panama, these were only the latest in a long series of events. Since the Revolutionary War the American military has engaged in joint as well as multinational



Combat Camera Imagery (Vette Walden)

The Chairman with civilian and military leaders in Skopje, Macedonia, during a visit to that former Yugoslav republic in support of Operation Provide Promise.

the Chairman

warfighting. However, those operations were frequently one-off events that demanded a high price in planning and training. Moreover, when the events were over, the separate forces disaggregated and returned to business as usual. Time and again the first battle of a conflict reminded us of the tremendous effort needed to assemble and employ a joint force, and despite the overall success of a campaign or assault, the cost in human life was too great. After mixed success in the 1970s and 1980s, the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 established the requirement to develop joint doctrine. Previously, no one individual or agency had responsibility for joint doctrine and no system existed to involve combatant commands in its development. The Goldwater-Nichols Act made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff singularly responsible for "developing doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces." The aim of the law was to compel the military to prepare to fight more readily as a joint force, improve interoperability, and prevent tragedies inherent in hasty planning and lack of preparation. Today, the way we conduct joint warfighting—the tactics, techniques, and procedures—is outlined in joint publications.

The Joint Staff was reorganized in response to Goldwater-Nichols with responsibility for joint training, exercises and evaluation, education, interoperability, and doctrine being placed under a single agency, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7). Since the reorganization in 1987 we have made tremendous strides in joint doctrine. We have identified critical areas which joint publications must address and developed formal procedures to involve the combatant commands. But as late as December 1992 we were unable to publish joint doctrine in a timely manner. Then just 13 joint publications were in circulation, and only nine more appeared last year. We were producing on average only two publications per month, and each required 48 months to complete. At that rate, it would have taken four and a half years to get the initial version of each publication to the field and fleet. That simply was not acceptable.

Since then we have stepped up the pace of production. Typical publication time is down to 21 months, and we are producing up to four publications per month. To date we have developed and issued 56 joint publications. The remaining 44 are under development, and we anticipate that two-thirds of them

will be published by the end of 1994. Moreover, in order to make the overall publications system more logical, it has been thoroughly revamped and a hierarchy of publications has been created to identify families of warfighting doctrine and to link them together under capstone and keystone publications (see the overview of the Joint Publication System on page 115).

Although our primary focus has been on rapidly developing these publications for CINCs, we are shifting our efforts in order to improve the readability, consistency, and overall quality of all joint publications. Future doctrinal publications will be produced in an easy-to-read, full-color format. Additionally, executive summaries will provide readers with a context to better understand the thrust of each publication. Our first priority is to review and reformat capstone and keystone publications with a deadline of October 1994. The Joint Staff—particularly J-7—is doing its best to provide products of high quality. Joint doctrine has become one of the true success stories of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. But the real job of understanding and applying joint doctrine falls to you. The limited resources of a smaller force means that we must employ the Armed Forces as a warfighting team, and to maximize this potential—for the best synergistic effect—each and every one of us must fully understand how to contribute to that team. We must give it the attention it deserves and we must get it right.

The senior leadership of the Armed Forces is committed to this effort. I am asking you to help. If you do not apply the principles—and the tactics, techniques, and procedures—found in joint publications when you train, then we will not have real doctrine, just a lot of dusty volumes taking up shelf space. Read the publications. Discuss the ideas contained in them and debate the ideas in the pages of professional military journals. More importantly, take the time to understand the concepts and principles spelled out in joint doctrine. Then apply them each day in your organization.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
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of the Joint Chiefs of Staff